Thomas is currently working on a full-length book about "micro-bionic" music (a style which describes The Domestic Front as well as many new electronic luminaries), composing the TDF swan song ("Having Achieved Balance, You Cannot Move Sideways, So You Rise") and living in an unspecified wooded area after having a mental collapse in Tokyo last. Stylistically this continues his previous release 'Having Achieved Balance, You Cannot Be Moved So You Rise', in which he shows himself as a capable electronic counterpart to Nurse With Wound. Whereas Stapleton incorporates acoustic sounds, instruments alongside electronics, The Domestic Front, a.k.a. Thom Bailey, a.k.a. Thomas Transparant. Jul 05, · The People’s Republic of China has imposed a new national security law for Hong Kong, provided for by Article 23 of the Basic Law, criminalizing sedition, collusion with foreign powers, subversion and terrorism - all run-of-the-mill contrived offenses used by autocracies. It is important to note that our Western conception of terrorism does not fully.
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Advance article alerts. New issue alert. Now the origins of this idea began in when the, first of all, the Kurdish parliament voted for it, and then a few months later the Iraqi National Congress adopted this policy in its historic conference in Salahuddin, northern Iraq, an event which I was privileged to attend and where I was asked to deliver a keynote talk on the subject. I came down strongly then in favor of the idea as I am in favor of it now, as a solution to the problems of the Iraqi state.
Incidentally, the INC later reaffirmed the position of federalism at its conference in New York, sorry. These votes were the first of their kind in the modern history of Iraq. Taken together, I submit they break the mold of Arab politics. There is no literature in Arabic on this idea of federalism to speak of, just as there is no experience of federalism, and yet today, and this is what I mean by breaking the mold, most Iraqi organizations that oppose the regime in Iraq, whether they are in the INC or not, advocate one interpretation or another of federalism.
No Iraqi political organization in fact can afford not to these days, especially not one that calls itself democratic. That is an immense gain for the people of Iraq, one which should not be frittered away by the disagreements which have also broken out naturally over what this moveable feast of a word might actually mean. Now, two features unite all definitions in play in the Iraqi political arena at the moment You Cannot Be Moved Sideways.So You Rise (CD) this question of federalism.
The first is the idea that federalism, whatever else it might mean, is a form of division of power, of separation of power from the center, Baghdad, towards the regions.
And the second is that no future state in Iraq can be democratic if it is not at the same time federal in structure. Now, the novelty of federalism is a reflection, I argue, of that of the novelty of the whole phenomenon of the post Iraqi opposition, an opposition grounded not in issues of, quote, "national liberation" and, quote, "armed struggle" and the struggle against "Zionism" and "imperialism," the catchall phrases that you all know of that have become part and parcel of Arab politics sincebut an opposition in Iraq whose be-all and end-all is hostility to its own homegrown dictatorship.
Now, admittedly, this opposition has not always been easy to deal with. It encompasses many diverse traditional and modern elements of Iraqi society. It is fractious. It is prone occasionally to in-fighting.
Nonetheless, I say it is remarkable that virtually all constituent parts agree on the need for representative democracy, the rule of law, a pluralist system of government and federalism.
Federalism, therefore, should be a cornerstone of the new Iraqi body politic. Unfortunately, however, neither the Kurdish Parliament nor the INC have yet developed in detail what they mean by this new idea. We are in the course of doing so in the INC and amongst Iraqis in general. Nor have we yet as an opposition developed the practical implications of this idea with regards to the mechanics of power sharing and resource distribution.
For Kurds, as we know, the word "federalism" has become a condition sine qua non for staying inside a new Iraq, and not trying to secede from it. Without a federal system of government, in which real power is devolved towards the regions, the currently autonomous predominantly Kurdish north will sooner or later opt for separation, and rightly so. After all that has been done to the Kurds in the name of Arabism, no Iraqi should expect otherwise, and certainly no one who calls him or herself a democrat.
As a result of this, there has arisen a purely utilitarian argument for federalism, one derived from a pragmatic calculus of what the balance of power in the immediate aftermath of Saddam's overthrow is going to look like. One must concede federalism, the argument goes among some Arabs, in the interest of getting rid of Saddam, and because the Kurds are today in a position to force it upon us. On the other hand, on the Kurdish side, the argument goes, we must accept federalism, not because we really want it, but because the regional situation does not allow for us to secede and have a separate state in northern Iraq.
Now, I want to say that I don't think that the project as big as restructuring the state of Iraq on a federal basis should be undertaken on the grounds of this kind of utilitarian calculus.
No ordinary Iraqi citizen can be expected to opt for it as an idea on such grounds of mere expediency. Federalism, if it is to become the founding principle of a new beginning in Iraq, must derive from a position of principle, and what might that be?
To begin with, federalism is an extension of the principle of the separation of powers, only this time power is being divided as well as separated. The divisions I'm talking about are those of the regions from one another. Without the divisions of powers, there can be no federalism worthy of the name.
Because the regime of Saddam Hussein was never willing to relinquish power except under duress, for example, in the accords, none of its past concessions to the Kurds could ever be taken seriously. They were here one day and gone the next.
By contrast, a truly federal system of government is a structurally new system in which power itself is from the outset both separated and divided. From this point of view, federalism is what you might call the first step towards a state system, resting on the principle that the rights of the part or the minority should never be sacrificed to the will of the majority.
The fundamental principle of human rights surely is that the rights of the part, be that part defined as a single individual or a whole collectivity of individuals who speak another language and have their own culture, that these parts of inviolable by the state. Federalism, therefore, becomes, is about the rights of those collective parts of the mosaic that is Iraqi society. Now, how should these different parts of the new Iraqi federation be defined? One important approach or argument rests on the idea of ethnicity as the basis of the constituent parts of the federation.
An idea at play in the Iraqi arena at the moment is to have Iraq composed of two regions, the first Arab, the second Kurdish. Ethnicity is, according to this point of view, the most fundamental basis for federalism in Iraq.
Not illogically and for understandable reasons, the Kurds are the driving force behind this definition. By and large, non-Kurdish Iraqis have three problems with this formulation:. First, it will cause ethnicity to become the basis for making territorial claims and counterclaims especially with regards to high profit resources located in one region and not another. The fight over Kirkuk, for instance, is already moving in this direction with Arab, Kurdish and Turkoman claims fighting with one another over this oil-rich city.
Second objection is that when a federation is defined as being about two ethnic groups, then clearly all the other ethnic groups who do not have a share in the federation are being to some degree or another discriminated against. Such discrimination in favor of the two largest ethnic groups in Iraq is inherently undemocratic. The third objection is that we cannot, we simply cannot map out on the ground a federation that included all the different ethnic and religious groups in Iraq. These groupings are not all territorially concentrated.
Therefore, a federation of many ethnic groups would be no improvement on a federation made up of only two large groups. Now, the clear alternative to ethnicity is territoriality in which each separate region receives its share of national resources, for instance, oil revenues, according to the relative size of its population. A good argument can be made, as I believe Michael Rubin has made in a recent article that I read. In fact, I took the idea from his article, that for the extension of this UN formula to the whole of Iraq.
The future all-Iraqi federation should not be one of different ethnicities but one of different geographically defined territories within which different ethnicities may form a majority. The point becomes not to dilute or diminish the Kurdishness of a Kurd or the Arabness of an Arab.
It is to put a premium on the equality of citizenship for all. Now, if we follow this way of thinking to its logical extreme, we end up with a corollary of territoriality as a basis for federalism. And that is a very important new idea for the Middle East, namely, that the new Iraqi state cannot be thought of any longer in any politically meaningful sense of the word as an Arab entity.
This is a novel idea for the region. And one that it will take some time for it to assimilate. But it follows inexorably from a territorial definition of regions as opposed to an ethnic one.
Israel is today a Jewish state in which a substantial number of Arab Palestinians, more than a million, have Israeli citizenship, but are not and cannot in principle ever be full-fledged citizens of the state. The fact that they live in better conditions than their brethren in the West Bank and Gaza, or certainly in better conditions than those in refugee camps all over the Arab world, is not an argument for second-class citizenship. In principle, because they are in a religiously or ethnically defined state, they are in some sense on a different status and it seems to me that one day in the future, perhaps a very long way down the line, these two principles upon which the modern state of Israel was founded, ethnicity and democracy, are probably going to have some form of, come to some sort of conflict with one another.
I argue we should not want such a formula for Iraq. Iraqis deserve to live in an area in which a Kurd or a Chaldean or an Assyrian or a Turkoman, be they male or female, can all in principle be elected to the highest offices of the land. That means that even though the Arabs form a majority in the country, their majority status should not put them in a position ever to exclude anyone else from positions of power and influence, as has been the case in a regime led by a party that calls itself the Arab Baath Socialist Party, and that views itself as part of a larger Arab nation.
A democratic Iraq has to be an Iraq that by definition exists for all its citizens equally, regardless of race, ethnicity or religion, and that means, let's face it, a non-Arab Iraq. Which brings me to the third precondition of a genuinely democratic state in Iraq, its relationship to religion. I said before that I was speaking only for myself and I emphasize on this subject especially I am only speaking for myself.
Nothing has so diminished Islam in recent times as its politicization. The quality of Islamic education, scholarship and spiritual guidance declined dramatically once the nationalist secular regimes of the post-colonial period came into existence and took over these functions. Nor has the resurgence of political Islam from the s onwards improved matters.
On the contrary, the youth of Iran today are turning against the very clergy whom their parents had helped bring to power a generation ago. One hears criticism on the streets of Tehran these days coming from some of the more enlightened ulama who played a leading role in the '79 revolution.
Nonetheless, Iran has to be counted a success story in comparison with the atrocities that have been perpetrated in the name of Islam and among Muslims in Algeria and until recently in Egypt and the Sudan. Or in comparison, needless to say, with September 11, and the name of Osama bin Laden, and what that has done to the image of Muslims throughout the world. The substitution of jihad for worship is the gravest travesty perpetrated upon Islam in modern times. It will take much, much work by Muslims to undo its deeply pernicious effect.
And when Saddam Hussein hails the "martyrdom"--so-called--of Palestinian suicide bombers and distributes large sums of money to their families or when he uses the resources of the Iraqi people to build mosques as propaganda during the Iraqi-Iran war, he too is degrading Islam by using it to further a political agenda.
The cumulative effect of these decades of abuse has served ultimately to conceal from Muslims and Arabs, in particular, Muslim Arabs in particular, the immense and still unexamined terrain of their own great contribution to human civilization. Culture and the life of the spirit have been degraded in Iraq by action of the state. To guard against the resurgence of such abuse, Iraqis need to invent a concept of statehood that will give all religions in the country the opportunity to flourish once again.
Christianity and Judaism have very deep roots in Iraqi history. The Babylonia Tlmud was written just south of Baghdad. And the many, very many branches of the Eastern Church, which flourished in Iraq, predate Islam and are among the very earliest churches in the history of Christianity.
So what, if any, is the relationship which ought to exist between the new Iraqi state and Islam, and religion, specifically the religion of the overwhelming majority of Iraqis, Islam? That is something which ultimately, of course, only the people of Iraq can decide upon in the course of their deliberations during a transitional period. But one way of thinking about these issues is to pose them in the very way that Iraqis have experienced this abuse of Islam by the regime of Saddam Hussein, and I would do that not by asking Iraqis the simplistic and somewhat ideological question, do you want a secular state or not, but by asking more concretely something like the following:.
Do you want your future state to be involved in any way in your religious beliefs either by way of compelling or persuading you towards a religious belief? Do you want your future state to define individual citizens as members of different religious cases, as is the case, for instance, in the confessional system in Lebanon?
Do you think, in other words, one should ask in Iraq that an individual's religious beliefs are relevant to his or her rights as a citizen, rights and obligations as a citizen? Do you, fellow Iraqi, want your future state to promote, regulate, direct, or otherwise interfere in matters of religion through, for instance, the Ministry of Awqaf, which has a long history of such involvement?
Do you trust your Iraqi politicians enough, given your experience with them, to give them any kind of influence of control over your religious affairs? And finally, do you think Iraqi clerics, or ulama, in their religious capacity, not as individual citizens, have the knowledge and experience required to decide upon your political affairs?
Now, if you put the question that way, I think that--but this is just a supposition--that Iraqi experience would suggest that the answer to all of these questions is no. And if I were to hazard a guess, that is how I think they would vote. That, in effect, means that the Iraqis have chosen to keep matters of politics and matters of faith separate from one another. But I want to move on to the fourth precondition for what I consider a genuinely democratic experience in Iraq, and that is the demilitarization of the Iraqi state.
Now, I have left what is perhaps the most important question of all, given the history of Iraq's wars of aggression and build up of weapons of mass destruction until the end. And perhaps that's because my views on this have not changed sincewhen I joined up with more than other people to put my name--and by the way, other Iraqis, of course, from every ethnic and religious domination, and from all walks of life, to put our names on to a document called then Charter And the relevant passages of that document in relation to this question of demilitarization read as follows:.
Quote: "The notion that strength resides in large-standing armies and up-to-date weapons of destruction has proved bankrupt. Real strength is always internal, in the creative, cultural, and wealth producing capabilities of a people.
It is found in civil society, not in the army or in the state. Armies often threaten democracy. The larger they grow, the more they weaken civil society. Therefore"--the document calls--"conditional upon international and regional guarantees which secure the territorial integrity of Iraq, preferably within a framework of the overall reduction in the levels of militarization in the Middle East, a new Iraqi constitution should:".
The right of the belligerency of the Iraqi state will not be recognized. Now, this last paragraph, no doubt many of you will recognize is an adaptation of the Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, and it's highly significant, I think, that so many people put their names to that idea.
I am convinced that if the territorial integrity of the country were to be guaranteed by treaties and by an outside power, the overwhelming majority of Iraqis, certainly its Kurdish and Shiite populations, will vote for such a far-reaching completely transforming program of demilitarization. Quite understandably, some sections of the Iraqi population will worry about the implications on them of such of a loss of an institution that has been important in guaranteeing some stability in the country.
Those fears, particularly those of the Sunni population in Baghdad are legitimate fears, and The Domestic Front - Having Achieved Balance need to be properly addressed. The country will after all, like post-war Germany, need very powerful internal law and order institutions. But like Germany and Japan, after World War II, Iraq's future lies in unshackling itself in no uncertain way from the burden of its past and focusing all the creative energies of the country on reconstruction and renewal, and cultural renewal.
I began by talking about regime change providing a historic opportunity for the United States government and the Iraqi opposition, an opportunity I said that was as large as anything that has happened in the Middle East since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. By that, you now know I meant a federal, non-Arab, demilitarized Iraq. This vision or something approximating it is achievable. Moreover, an Iraqi leadership able to work in partnership with the United States to bring it about exists.
The question that I cannot answer, however, is: Will the new resolve that America has found in itself post-September 11 rise imaginatively to the level of the opportunity it is itself about to create in the Middle East?
Thank you. That was wonderful. We're going to move on to our discussants. We have at different times asserted that the shape of the peace may determine the shape of a war, and I invite our discussants to comment on Mr.
Each discussant will take up to five minutes, and then we will have Q and A, and I apologize. We are slipping on time. Rend, perhaps you would be kind enough to begin? I have to speak up because my voice is real low. Kanan, thank you very much. Of course, as you know, I wholeheartedly agree with almost everything you said, or everything, not almost. I have two cautions. One of them is Kanan was rightly skeptical about U. And I want to say that the signs right now are absolutely inauspicious.
It seems to me that the U. I was very disappointed to see that the resolution, the congressional resolution, neither in the shape that it went to Congress from the White House nor in the shape that it was rephrased by the Gephardt caucus, had any mention of the U. I find myself perhaps even more skeptical than Kanan on this issue, and the reason I judge that is because of the way that I see the U.
One of the problems that the American administration will not face up to is that it has enormous leverage with Iraqis. It has now and it will have later, and that any vision that it espouses is going to influence the way that the Iraqi opposition works now and that Iraq is going to be shaped in the future.
Unfortunately, the way that the U. And one example that I will give is this extraordinary reluctance of the U. In fact, before Saddam falls.
And to actually announce its endorsement for such a transitional authority. So that we do not go into Iraq in a complete vacuum of security and a vacuum of command and authority control, which I anticipate happening. I find that the administration is very coy in endorsing the democratic elements and the democratic vision of certain segments of the Iraqi opposition, and much more inclined to endorse what I will call in the next two minutes the regressive forces in Iraq. This leads me to my next fear in terms of actually bringing about Kanan's vision, and that is if you look at Iraq, there has been an absence of politics for 35 years.
Politics really froze in in Iraq. And what we see now, in fact, in the Iraqi political scene, there is no such thing as the Czech Civic Forum, for example, in Iraq, and this is an enormous gap, a hole, in fact, in our thinking.
What do we have instead? We have political parties or political groups, political thinking, that emerged in the '60s and froze in This is the kind of political thinking that I think called extraterritorial.
In other words, we have Arab nationalism. We have Islamists. We have communists. These are the sort of major culls. Of course, there are variations on these themes, but all these themes are themes that emerged in the '50s, in the '60s, and essentially froze in time, ossified in time.
And there has been no injection except for the attempts by people like Kanan to inject any new type of political thinking in this Iraqi opposition. And I think this is a very dangerous situation because when we talk about the balance of power in Iraq on the day that Saddam goes, what we have ready-made are these ossified extraterritorial ideologies with an insufficient momentum of new thinking, of modernizing thinking, that can actually emanate from the reality of Iraq and for Iraq's present and from Iraq's needs in the future.
In other words, an Iraqi politics and not an extraterritorial politics. I feel very concerned because this is a great disadvantage, and we are not going to have very much time. This kind of formation, political formation, needs to begin now, and needs to be done by Iraqis and needs to be supported by the U.
I will stop here, Danni, and give time to other people. Being the only Kurd on this panel, I am culturally tempted to think this is a conspiracy designed to sideline the Kurdish people. After all, it's not long ago that it was official U. I think over the last decade, we Iraqis have come to understand that the battle of Baghdad can only be won after winning that of Washington. In the latter case, and my remark here is going to be very brief, we are in dire need of the help of all Americans who believe that U.
And I put it to you, ladies and gentlemen, that if such assistance was forthcoming, Iraqi democrats could take care of the rest. Richard, can take care of you. PERLE: As I've listened to our Iraqi friends, my thought has been that the disappointment that the failure of the senior administration officialdom to show up is not so much because of what he or she might have had to say, but because of what he or she might have had an opportunity to hear.
And we've heard some important and I think greatly encouraging views, because despite the criticism, which seems to me entirely justified, of the lack of vision that has thus far been demonstrated with respect to Iraq after Saddam, that challenge ultimately is in the hands of Iraqis. It's in your hands, Kanan, and yours and yours.
And whatever deficiencies may exist on the side of the liberators, one can't help but be impressed about the strengths of the liberated. And I have little doubt that the people of Iraq will be liberated, will get through the discussions at the United Nations, and will come to understand that inspections are not enough, won't work anyway. And we will ultimately be driven from the default position to which governments invariably retreat, which is to alter the status quo as little as possible.
It is, in fact, the natural posture of governments to accept the status quo, and when it becomes monstrously inconvenient, to change it to the minimum extent necessary. But the liberation of Iraq, the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, can't be a halfway measure. It can't stop with a short-term objective, however important, of removing from his hands the weapons of mass destruction.
Can one imagine sending the Chicago police into take Al Capone's weapons away, and leaving him there? Can anyone imagine that if the The Domestic Front - Having Achieved Balance of mass destructions were disgorged tomorrow, we could be confident with Saddam in place that we wouldn't face the same problem again? Of course not. The only solution in Iraq is the substitution of the thugs who now run the place with the kinds of people you see at this table.
I want to make only a couple of very brief additional comments. One of the more dangerous ideas that is already around is the idea that in the immediate post-Saddam situation, power will flow to Iraqis who are now in Iraq. One hears this notion about the Department of State. It's based on, it seems to me, the idea that people who have labored outside Iraq for the liberation of their country somehow have less credibility than those who have found a way to get along with Saddam's regime.
I think this is profoundly mistaken, and it is yet another example of the magnetic attraction of the status quo. I think it will turn out to be nonsense. The people of Iraq are not going to empower those who have lived among them as part of the oppression that they will be determined to root out. So it is people like the people on this panel who will return to Iraq, and Iraqis in an Iraqi diaspora, who in large numbers I believe will return to Iraq, to work together with those millions of Iraqis who have been the victims of Saddam Hussein.
A second notion that it seems to me is all too readily accepted around the diplomatic establishment, but needs to be challenged, is the idea that the whole of the Arab world is somehow going to align itself with Saddam Hussein, that if military action against Iraq takes place, Arabs everywhere will associate themselves with what is one of the most vicious regimes in human history. I think that is a demeaning, condescending view of Arabs. And I think in the event, when it becomes clear that the end result of military action against the regime of Saddam Hussein will produce the opportunity, the kind of vision you've heard around this table, the Arab world or most of it, and certainly most of the Muslim world, will consider that their honor and dignity has been restored by removing from among them a regime that they have every reason to despise along with the rest of us.
CHALABI: I hope that the brave, well structured and novel ideas that Kanan has put before you and the comments of both Rend and Siyamend about the future of Iraq should put to rest any notion that Iraqis have not thought about the future and that there is going to be a vacuum of ideas and of leaders after the removal of Saddam Hussein. I hope that this also will put to rest the notion that because people cannot identify concepts and leaders that nothing should be done to remove Saddam Hussein.
Democracy and freedom in Iraq are not the enemy of The Domestic Front - Having Achieved Balance in the region. This vision of how Iraqis will behave that is composed and discussed many times in the press and in policy circles here and in European countries and in Arab countries is not true. It is not accurate. The concepts that Kanan has put before you are well developed ideas for a modern democratic federal state in Iraq.
They may not be universally accepted now. There may be dissensions among them, but this dialogue, this discussion, is reminiscent of a discussion for nation-building in a society, in a modern society, which one must nurture and encourage to develop.
I am particularly pleased to say to you that President Bush's speech in the United Nations on September 12 was a galvanizing influence for Iraqis. Iraqis were ecstatic that the President of the United States in his speech before the United Nations adopted the program and the grievances of the Iraqi people alongside the threat of Saddam to international peace and security and his possession of weapons of mass destruction.
He spoke about genocide that Saddam has perpetrated in Iraq. He spoke about torture, about the lack of freedom and about the Iraqi people deserving a better government. This was a very strong You Cannot Be Moved Sideways.So You Rise (CD) to the Iraqi people that finally the United States is not only concerned with Resolution about disarmament, but the president was speaking about Resolutionwhich said that the government of Saddam Hussein should stop the oppression of the Iraqi people before all other United Nations resolutions in his speech.
I am also particularly gratified that after a decade of struggle, the principles that were adopted by the Iraqi National Congress Conference in Salahuddin, inhave come to be seen as the unifying principles for a future Iraq. All Iraqi opposition forces accept them. The United States has come around to accepting them, and this process now is enshrined in law in the United States, which is referred to in the new congressional resolution. And I speak of that liberation act that was passed by Congress in Rend made a very important point here.
Iraq according to the prevailing political ideologies that have done battle on the Iraqi people for power are--all of them do not see Iraq as a final country. Arabism sees Iraq as part of the Arab world. Islamists see Iraq as part of the Islamic Uman [ph]. Kurdish nationalist parties see the Kurds as part of a larger Kurdish nation, and as if all those political parties and competing ideologies who have fought on the Iraqi body politic do not, are telling the people that Iraq is not worth preserving.
Of course, this is patently not true. Although Iraq was carved out of the remnant of the Ottoman Empire by the victorious allies after the First World War, the Iraqi people are an ancient people living in this society. The borders of modern Iraq are not so important as the fact of cultural continuity that have prevailed in this land since the first structure of modern societies, of society and human experience.
Iraqis are heirs to the tradition of the Sumarians, to Hammurabi's legal code, are heirs to the Jewish intellectual tradition that prevailed in Iraq, are heirs to the Muslim renaissance that prevailed in Iraq, and are heirs to the struggle of the Iraqi people in the 20th century, and the Iraqi people can move forward.
I think now the way to move to translate those ideas into action and to satisfy the prerequisites that Kanan has put forward for a successful outcome in Iraq must be that the United States is engaged fully now in enabling Iraqis to seize political control of the debate now and transform this. As soon as free Iraqis can land on any part of Arab Iraq, that this landing will be simultaneous with the proclamation of a provisional coalition government in Iraq which will seek to assert sovereignty and authority over any territory of Iraq, evacuated by Saddam, and those pieces of Iraq that continue to be under Saddam's control, and then this government should be the ally of the United States in the coming military conflict, which we don't see as a war between Iraq and the United States, but rather as a war of national liberation that the Iraqi people are waging and that the United States has now for its own purposes decided to support and to win.
This provisional coalition government will be the focus of any defecting units of the Iraqi military that do not want to defend Saddam and want a place to go, a home to go to. It will be charged with dealing with the horrendous humanitarian situation that may arise.
This government will provide people with food, with emergency relief, and also with increasing the purchasing power of the Iraqi dinar to immediately improve the quality of life of the Iraqi people. All these are possible to achieve, and then this government would then at a later stage draw up, call a constituent assembly and draw up a constitution, put to public referendum, and have elections on the basis of this constitution.
The engagement of the United States is essential. The fears of Iraqis now cannot be addressed by going into the past, but rather by coming to a settlement through future hope for democracy. And I want to emphasize also now that Iraq is a rich country.
Iraq has more oil reserves than any other country in the Middle East, in the world, including Saudi Arabia. Iraqi oil is available, close to the sea and close to the ground. Iraq can pay for all those things, and Iraq with the assistance of the United States must be able to transform its underground oil wealth into readily available cash now. This can only be done through an international economic conference that is called by the United States to deal with the issues of sanctions, reparations and Iraqi debt.
These are essential components for the stability of a future Iraq. The neighbors of Iraq are afraid of the vision that has been articulated today. They're afraid of democracy. They're afraid of federalism. They're afraid of an Iraqi state which does not proclaim a national ideology or a national identity in terms of ethnic and egregious nationalist concepts.
Those fears do not stem from any misconception about the Iraqi opposition's ideas about the future of Iraq. They stem from the successful example of the implementation of those ideas in a country, in the Middle East as central as Iraq is. I think that the United States must take stock of these potential contradictions, and I think the United States must follow the vision that is commensurate with its own values and its own ideas.
The United States cannot support dictatorship over democracy, and the United States will not do that, and I don't think the United States can support tyranny over freedom in Iraq.
O'HANLON: It's an honor and an inspiration to be on this panel today, and it makes me regret that my first comment may not go over so well, but I'm going to try to get beyond that quickly into a couple of other comments that may go over a little better.
The first point I'd like to make simply is that I do believe we have to continue with the President's September 12 UN strategy, putting a firm multilateral ultimatum before Iraq, putting the onus on Saddam Hussein to have the last final chance to accept international inspections and disarmament or otherwise have war as the outcome. There is the very real chance that war will be the outcome; there is also a very real chance that war will not be the outcome. And we will ultimately accept a rigorous disarmament inspection process in my judgment.
I think this is, from my point of view, as looking at this from an American national security perspective, despite the unfortunate consequences for the Iraqi people, this is still an outcome that I could accept.
But also, perhaps more importantly for this audience today, I think it's an outcome that we have to be willing to risk in order to make sure we have the kind of support we would need to go to war if that becomes the outcome. I agree partially with Richard Perle's point that Arab countries will be supportive of this campaign regardless. But I don't think the support is yet sufficient. The Saudi support, for example, is soft right now.
If we go to war without Saudi bases, airspace and infrastructure, we are not preparing properly in a military or political sense for the kind of campaign that I think is needed.
So I think you have to go through the formalities and the effort of trying to get a tough inspection disarmament process going before you make the decision to go to war. And I think if you do that, there's a very real chance actually that you will not go to war, but if you do go to war, you will not have one hand tied behind your back.
Why is that important, getting into comments that I hope will go over perhaps a little better? If we're going to do this, we have to do in the spirit that's been articulated this morning, viewing Iraq's long-term future as a democratic state, as a core American national security interest. We have to go in and win this war quickly, and then be prepared to help stabilize Iraq over an indefinite period, five to ten years, at a minimum, I believe, using a large fraction of American forces.
University of Chicago Press. McCormick, — Northwestern University Press. American Historical Review. Houghton Mifflin. Smith Jr. Public Opinion in a Democracy.
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domestic front (Minns, ). Other critics This epitomises the move of cooking from a. valued occupation or chore (Oakley, / Some people cannot afford spending that time, especially. February: Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy gives a speech saying, "While I cannot take the time to name all the men in the State Department who have been named as members of the Communist Party and members of a spy ring, I have here in my hand a list of " The speech marks the beginning of McCarthy's anti-communist pursuits. Nov 23, · There are a number of European teams that have won more domestic top flight championships than Bayern Munich but you have to look far and wide to find any who have won 22 in the last 45 seasons.
Nov 15, · The more time you have before the deadline - the less price of the order you will have. Thus, this service offers high-quality essays at the optimal price. However, on the domestic front, the demand wasn’t shrinking much. This caused huge premiums and a wide gap between global and domestic gold prices. CD ROM Drives, DVD Drives/DVD.
Nov 15, · The more time you have before the deadline - the less price of the order you will have. Thus, this service offers high-quality essays at the optimal price. However, on the domestic front, the demand wasn’t shrinking much. This caused huge premiums and a wide gap between global and domestic gold prices. CD ROM Drives, DVD Drives/DVD. Joseph S. Nye defined soft power as the power of attraction to affect the behavior of other states through the use of non-coercive instruments including culture, political values and foreign policy.
Joseph S. Nye defined soft power as the power of attraction to affect the behavior of other states through the use of non-coercive instruments including culture, political values and foreign policy.
wahunate: You may see where you think mpr is going, but if he is right, please note you cannot even get there, to the 4 TANs = 1 euro, because long before you do, someone with a tax liability, either past due or at due ANY point in the future (ok, so discount present values and such, get out your HP12C, plug and chug) will sell euros and buy. Apr 10, · News News/Business. Live coverage of House proceedings.
Jul 05, · The People’s Republic of China has imposed a new national security law for Hong Kong, provided for by Article 23 of the Basic Law, criminalizing sedition, collusion with foreign powers, subversion and terrorism - all run-of-the-mill contrived offenses used by autocracies. It is important to note that our Western conception of terrorism does not fully.
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